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world. However, until fairly recently, most CA research into
institutional interaction concentrated on service encounters, and
CA-inspired research that looked at the fine-grained analysis
of naturally occurring talk in organizational contexts remained
relatively rare. Yet, as Svennevig (2012) points out, this body
of work has now been expanding to look at phenomena such
as leadership (Clifton, 2006), power (Samra-Fredericks, 2005),
strategizing (Samra-Fredericks, 2004), authority (Benoit-Barné
& Cooren, 2009), and so on. Moreover, within this trend the
language of meetings is becoming increasingly of interest (e.g.,
Asmuß & Svennevig, 2009; Ford, 2008; Svennevig, 2012).
However, despite the flurry of interest in socio-epistemics and
its relation to the sequential properties of talk within the wider
CA field (e.g., Stivers, Mondada, & Steensig, 2011), little of this
work has specifically addressed epistemics in business meetings. The purpose of this article is thus to add to research (e.g.,
Clifton, 2012; Djordjilovic 2012; Markaki & Mondada, 2012)
that combines findings of CA’s insights into socio-epistemics
with the study of business meetings. In so doing the article seeks
to provide an analysis of the way in which social actors use
the sequential properties of talk to talk into being status-based
states of knowing (Enfield, 2011) that index the hierarchy of
the organization and so constitute the organization as a lived
in situ achievement. More specifically, using audio transcripts
of naturally occurring talk recorded during a staff meeting at
the national office of a worldwide cultural organization, this
article seeks to explicate the discursive resources that organizational players use in order to “do” displays of knowledge.
The doing of such displays of knowledge enables the director
and the assistant director to act as one party in talk and to enact
an interactional team with superior knowledge of “what’s going
on” at head office. Being in the know about what is going on at
head office thus indexes their superior position on the corporate
ladder and their hierarchically superior position vis-à-vis other
members of staff. Moreover, because such displays of knowledge are status based, they also enact authority. This is because
rights to have and display knowledge are based on legitimate
positions and identity-bound rights rather than actual states of
knowledge.

Increasingly, organizational research is taking the linguistic
turn in social sciences seriously. Consequently, the central role of
communication in the constitution of the organization is also finding greater acceptance. Using conversation analysis as a research
methodology and transcripts of naturally occurring talk as data,
the purpose of this article is to add to this growing body of research
and to explicate how orientation to epistemic rights talks the hierarchy of the organization into being. Findings indicate how the
negotiation of rights to have and to display status-based knowledge
of head office index the discursive identities of knowing participants, which enacts the situated identities of hierarchic superiors.
Therefore, through the sequential properties of talk, status-based
epistemic rights and obligations are enacted so that a management
team is made relevant, which incarnates the lived hierarchy of
the organization and “does” authority. Organization Management
Journal, 11: 4–14, 2014. doi: 10.1080/15416518.2014.903089
Keywords meetings; epistemics; conversation analysis; teams;
communicative constitution of organization; authority

INTRODUCTION
The idea that talk is much more than an asocial mechanism
for the transfer of messages and that talk is constitutive of organization and the identities of social actors within organizations
is becoming widely accepted within organizational research.
This increasing interest in discursive approaches to organization has not gone unnoticed by researchers such as Cooren
(2010), Bargiela-Chiappini and Harris (1997), Boden (1994),
and Taylor and van Every (2000), who, in order to study the
communicative constitution of organization, use ethnomethodologically inspired research methods to analyze transcripts of
naturally occurring talk within organizational contexts. More
specifically, conversation analysis’ (CA’s) interest in institutional interaction (Drew & Heritage, 1992) has also encouraged
CA-inspired researchers to take an interest in the organizational
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Since the “linguistic turn” in social science (Rorty, 1967),
static understandings of organization whereby a social actor’s
position in the hierarchy of the organization determines what
that actor can and cannot say are increasingly being challenged
by the view that organizations are incrementally constructed
as the interaction unfolds and that organizations are made discursively available in and by the talk of their members. Yet
definitions of discourse are varied. Alvesson and Kärreman’s
(2000) seminal article makes the distinction between little-d
discourse and big-D Discourse. Little-d discourse refers to the
micro-practices of talk and the processes through which organizational actors construct emotions, knowledge, identities, and
so on, which accomplish the organization. Big-D Discourse
refers to discourses of, for example, management, leadership,
the market, and so on, which constitute the subject. The exact
nature of the interplay between these discourses is a moot
point. Critical discourse analysis (CDA), which Van Dijk (2001,
p. 352) defines as “a type of discourse analytical research that
primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and
inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and
talk in the social and political context,” seeks to establish the
interplay between big-D and little-d discourses by reference to
extratextual conceptions of power and so on. For example, taking a CDA perspective, Mantere and Vaara (2008) use interview
data with managers in a company to discern which Discourses
of participation are at work and how these Discourses construct subject positions and so do hegemony. At the level of
discourse little-d, various researchers have attempted to locate
the micro-practices of talk through which strategy is achieved.
For example, Clifton and Van De Mieroop (2010) examine the
rhetorical strategies that are used to do persuasion in meetings.
Other researchers, such as McClellan and Deetz (2012), analyze
transcripts of meeting talk and examine the way organizational
Discourses (namely, those of art, education, community, and
business) in an art college were enacted at the level of local
discourse. McClelland and Deetz are particularly interested in
the way in which some Discourses are accepted and others are
resisted and how this affects the way in which the organization
is talked into being and understood by social actors.
Other researchers, however, remain skeptical of the ability to reveal macro-processes in the micro. As Knorr-Cetina
(1981, p. 28) argues, there are “influences which operate behind
the back of agents, and which therefore cannot be found in
micro-situations” (italics in the original). From this perspective, in order to explain “what is going on” the researcher
therefore needs to have recourse to extratextual information
operating beyond the talk. However, CA argues that participants
are aware that they are inhabitants of a particular environment
and that their contributions to talk are made in the knowledge
of what constitutes an allowable contribution, given the situation (Levinson, 1992). It is in this way that they orient to
social structure, which is then reified as external and constraining. Consequently, the researcher does not have to go looking
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for exogenous concerns to explicate what is going on and how
this is achieved. Indeed, Schegloff (1997) famously, though
contentiously (cf. Billig, 1999), demonstrates that researchers
drawing on issues that are “behind the backs” of the participants might offer analyses that do not bind with the data and
so end up being demonstrably irrelevant to the members’ concerns. In short, as Schegloff (1987a, p. 208) argues, “Although
it [the turn-taking system] is not what sociologists ordinarily
think of a ‘social organization’, in many ways it is the apotheosis of social organization.” Consequently, this article takes a
CA-inspired approach to discourse, which emphasizes that the
organization is talked into being by organizational players as
they recipient-design (i.e., members design their talk with particular recipients in mind and as appropriate for the recipients)
their talk for each other and so manage identities with respective rights and obligations vis-à-vis each other and so establish
and sustain the organization as a discursive achievement.
METHOD—CONVERSATION ANALYSIS
Conversation analysis was developed by Harvey Sacks and
colleagues during the mid-1960s. It involves the detailed examination of transcriptions of recordings of naturally occurring
talk from which researchers describe the sequential organization of everyday language use and the social order that
it reveals. In their seminal article, “A Simplest Systematics
for the Organization of Turn-Taking in Conversation,” Sacks,
Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974) set out to reveal the locally managed, party-administered, and interactionally controlled systematic organization of turn taking (i.e., the sequential properties
of talk) in conversation. However, CA’s interest is not only
restricted to the machinery of talk. CA also considers the
sequential organization of talk to be the “bedrock of all sociality” (Schegloff, 1987b, p. 103). From this perspective, social
order is incarnated through members’ orientation to the contextsensitive nature of such turn-taking practices and through their
orientation to identities-in-talk constituted by the recipientdesign of the talk. Thus, as Sacks et al. (1974, p. 729) argue,
the sequential properties of talk in interaction are context sensitive, and patterns of turn-taking vary according to the situation
(e.g., ceremonies, debates, or meetings). This observation gives
rise to the notion of institutional interaction whereby orientation to the institutional nature of talk is made visible in terms
of sequence organization, turn design, lexical choice, and epistemological and other forms of asymmetry (Heritage, 1997,
p. 164). Orientation to these constraints and resources leads to
the notion of members’ own orientation to what they perceive
to be allowable contributions to the interaction (Levinson, 1992,
p. 97), which thus talks the organization into being. Heritage
sums up this fundamental claim of CA when he states that
the details of little, local sequences which at first seemed narrow, insignificant and contextually uninteresting, turn out to be the
crucial resources by which larger institutionalized activity frameworks are evoked. Such institutional contexts are created as visible
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states of affairs on a turn-by-turn basis. It is ultimately through such
means that “institutions” exist as accountable organizations of social
actions. (Heritage, 1984, p. 290)

In short, to borrow a term from Boden (1994, p. 14), (organizational) “structure is thus realised in action.” This is because
when people talk they are simultaneously and reflexively talking
into being both the organization and their identities with commensurate rights and obligations vis-à-vis each other. Following
Zimmerman (1998), identities exist both at proximal and distal
levels. At a proximal level, discourse identities (e.g., speaker,
listener, etc.) are enacted through the sequences of talk. Such
discourse identities reflexively make relevant situated identities
(e.g., teacher, student, manager, customer, seller, etc.) at a distal level. Consequently, discourse identities, such as knowing
and unknowing participants,which are contingent on the proximal turn-by-turn context, reflexively make relevant situated
identities, which include inter alia such institutional identities
as manager, subordinate, and so on. Moreover, such identities often exist in standard relational pairs (e.g., cop–robber,
teacher–student, mother–baby), and these pairs are defined by
a series of moral rights and obligations linked to each other
(Sacks, 1972) and so inter alia can index asymmetric relations
such as superior/subordinate. Furthermore, orientation to such
situated identities is necessary for the participants to perform
their everyday workplace activities, and it is this that reflexively
talks into being the structure of an organization. As Raymond
and Heritage (2006, p. 678) put it, “The ways in which identities are relevant for action-in-interaction constitute a basic
link between individuals and what social scientists have termed
‘social structure.’”
Furthermore, following Sacks et al. (1974, p. 728), the
researcher is able to analyze the members’ turn-by-turn construction of social order through the next turn proof procedure
whereby an understanding of what is happening in a turn at talk
is displayed by the other participants in the next turn. In this
way, participants construct and display to each other a mutual
understanding of what they consider is going on. This process is
also available to the researcher, who is also able to understand
the event through his/her membership knowledge (Garfinkel &
Sacks, 1970). Thus, the researcher using his or her overhearer’s
perspective on what is going on and how this is achieved also
has access to the participants’ perspectives as displayed in the
overheard interaction. Yet while the participants have a naive
mastery of what is going on and how this is achieved, the
researcher is able to describe this formally. As Lynch and Bogen
(1994, p. 80) state, “The member may be competent to instantiate the describable techniques of conversation, but the scientist
builds a formal apparatus that subsumes the members local
practices.”
CA and Teams
As Sacks et al. (1974, p. 696) make clear, the sequential properties of talk are party, rather than individually,

administered. Parties in turn-taking are often individuals but
they can also be aggregates of persons. Moreover, these aggregates of persons can “coincide with units of social organization
which can be claimed to have a persistence and reality quite
apart from the interaction” (Schegloff, 1995, p. 33). However,
Schegloff also notes that it is not on account of the extrainteractional ties that people act as a party, but rather it is
“by virtue of interaction-specific contingencies and conduct”
that parties in talk are constituted and it is this which talks
into being units of social organization (Schegloff, 1995, p. 33).
As Sacks (1992, vol. 1, p. 95) points out, in conversations of
more than two people, a two-party format may be a basic configuration so that people divide themselves up into teams so that
a whole series of people talking for that team and having coincumbency of a single identity could become relevant to the
interaction. Moreover, Sacks indicates that the creation of such
a “single party” is achieved through syntactic possibilities for
collaboration. As he says:
We get, then, a kind of extraordinary tie between syntactic
possibilities and phenomena like social organization. That is, an
extremely strong way that these kids go about demonstrating that,
for one, there is a group here, is their getting together to put this
sentences together, collaboratively. (Sacks, 1992, vol. 1 p. 145)

Parties-in-talk are thus constructed discursively. That is to
say that rather than being a priori facts that are brought to
the interaction, they have to be constructed by the participants as they interact (Schegloff, 1995). Furthermore, following
Kangasharju (1996, p. 292), teams are characterized by the
fact that participants explicitly act as an association by making
this association visible to other participants. Such interactional
teams are made visible through the way in which turns are
co-constructed and speaking rights are managed; participants
affiliate at an affective level, and align at a sequential level; and
participants realize shared accountability and authorship of the
action in progress (Djordjilovic, 2012, p. 113).

CA and Socio-Epistemics
Significantly, knowledge is neither absolute nor prediscursive. As various researchers (e.g., Drew, 1991; Heritage &
Raymond, 2005; Lynch & Bogen, 2005) point out, rights to display knowledge are not necessarily reflections of actual states
of knowledge. Rather, displays of what one knows and how one
comes to know it are played out in the social domain and are
recipient-designed according to the identities of the participants
in talk. Further, participants hold each other accountable for any
display of knowledge, and this accountability is made visible to
the researcher and participants alike in the sequential properties
of talk. Following Stivers et al. (2011), displays of knowledge
are played out in three domains: epistemic access, epistemic primacy, and epistemic responsibility. First, the notion of epistemic
access refers to the source of knowledge, which can be presented as either firsthand or secondhand. Firsthand accounts that
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directly access the events have more credibility than secondhand accounts, and, as Pomerantz (1984a, p. 609) argues, they
are possibly the most important way of presenting knowledge
as being known unproblematically and with certainty.
Second, epistemic responsibility relates to the recipient
design of the action whereby participants orient to expected levels of knowledge. Goodwin’s (1979, 1981, 1987) groundbreaking research, for example, demonstrated how talk is designed
according to the speaker’s orientation to the recipient’s state
of knowledge as knowing or unknowing participants. Other
research (e.g., Edwards & Potter, 1992; Lynch & Bogen, 2005;
Potter & te Molder, 2005) has shown how expectations of
knowledge linked to identity are made interactionally relevant
so that, for example, in a court case defendants are held legally
accountable for what they should, or should not, know and this
affects their displays of knowing.
Third, the notion of epistemic primacy indexes the relation
between speakers in terms of epistemic entitlement. Recent
research (e.g., Heritage, 2002; Heritage & Raymond, 2005;
Raymond & Heritage, 2006; Sneijder & te Molder 2006;
Stivers, 2005) has argued that relative rights to have and display knowledge are made visible in the sequential properties of
talk. Simply put, going first carries with it an inherent claim to
epistemic primacy simply because by going second a participant
is always open to the inference that he or she is being constrained by the content of the first turn (Heritage, 2002, p. 200).
However, as Raymond and Heritage (2006, p. 685) observe,
such sequential displays of epistemic rights can be negotiated
in a number of ways. For example, they argue that even though
first assessments in their unmarked form claim unmitigated
rights to assess, they can be upgraded through negative interrogatives, which strongly invite agreement in the next turn.
Furthermore, epistemic firsts can be downgraded through the
use of modifiers (e.g., looks, seems, thinks) or tag questions
that sequentially cede the first slot in the sequence, and so primacy, to the next speaker. Second assessments also come in
marked and unmarked forms. While unmarked seconds display
an acceptance of the primacy of the first turn, marked seconds,
which can be signaled by such phenomena as “oh” prefaces,
confirmation followed by agreement token, or tag questions, are
designed to contest the primacy inherent in the first position.
In short, each time a turn is taken participants display what
they can allowably know; what others are expected to know;
and what their relative rights to knowing are. Participants
thus design their displays of knowledge and police other participants’ displays of knowledge and so render each other
accountable. It is, therefore, through the recipient-designed
accountability of the sequential properties of talk that rights to
have and display knowledge are constructed in talk and thus
ultimately the organization’s hierarchy is also achieved in talk.
This is because, as Mondada (2011, p. 27) indicates, such an
allowable distribution of knowledge is not only consequential
for the achievement of tasks but it also achieves social affiliation that ultimately talks the hierarchy of the organization
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into being. Organization and hierarchy thus emerge, inter alia,
out of recipient-designed orientation to rights to have and display knowledge, which are essential resources for conducting
everyday workplace activities and which are reflexively reproduced as external and constraining social facts through that
same social interaction.

DATA
The data were audio-recorded during a monthly staff meeting
in a national office of a worldwide British cultural organization
which has its head office in the United Kingdom. The meeting
was held around a large rectangular table in the staff common room, and it took the form of the director of the center
(Andy) dealing with the points on the agenda one by one and
then asking specific participants for information about projects
that they were working on. Eighteen members of staff were
present. However, in the extract presented in this article only
four people spoke. These speakers have been given the following pseudonyms: Andy (the director), Betty (the assistant
director), Chris (the projects officer), and Debbie (the information and communications manager). The particular exchange
analyzed concerns the second point on the agenda, the Assistant
Director General’s visit to the national office. The topic of the
visit leads to a co-authored description of the key players and
their responsibilities at the UK head office. The talk has been
transcribed following Jeffersonian conventions (see appendix
for a list of transcription symbols used).
As Sacks (1984, p. 27) famously pointed out, data are
selected for analysis because the researcher just happens to have
them and becomes interested in them. Similarly, I used these
data simply because I had access to them. Moreover, the underlying methodological concern of CA is not to find data that
fit with any a priori assumptions. Rather, from a position of
“unmotivated looking” (Psathas, 1995, p. 45) whereby a priori
hypotheses are distanced from the analysis, CA takes any data
and sees what they reveal. Consequently, when I started to analyze these data, I had no a priori conception of what I was going
to find. To attempt to prove any a priori hypothesis would lead
to a theory-driven approach, which because of the danger of
trying to fit the analysis to prove a particular hypothesis might
make the researcher blind to what was happening. To paraphrase
Sacks’s (1984, p. 27) methodological dictum: I simply sat down
with some data and made some observations to see where they
would lead me.

ANALYSIS
The following analysis explicates how the situated identity
of superior is talked into being through orientation to discursive
identities of knowing and unknowing participant, which display knowledge of “what is going on in head office.” It can
be seen that the director and assistant director affiliate and
align in their displays or knowledge and so are co-incumbents
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of the discursive identity “knowing participants” and situated
identities superiors, which make relevant the interactional
achievement of team identity. In this way, the hierarchy of an
organization is achieved as a lived in situ members’ accomplishment. Moreover, displays of knowledge are based on the
claim of proximity to head office. This reflexively makes statusbased rights to knowledge relevant to the interaction and gives
them the right to know in accordance with their hierarchical
position, rather than actual states of knowledge. Consequently,
this enacts their authority to know about head office based on
their legitimate position in the organization. It therefore “does”
authority, which as Barley (1996, p. 434) notes can only be
enacted in an ideal bureaucracy when a superior’s knowledge
encompasses, or is perceived to encompass, that of his/her
subordinates.
In line 1, Andy introduces the topic that is the second point
on the agenda: just a quick word on Jim=Jim Pryde’s visit.
1. Andy
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

just a quick word on Jim=Jim Pryde’s visit (.) er Jim
is the assistant director
general (.) he’s part of the senior executive team which
consists of er Tom
Black as Director General and David Duffield Deputy
Director General and (.)
Jim as Assistant Director General (.) er Jim is the head
of the corporate affairs
group which erm (.) can’t = I’m not sure how best to
describe its function it’s
essentially do:ing the kind of wo:rk that’s sort of
non-operational work it’s
communications it’s er: the legal affairs department it’s
the diversity (.) er
person er Anita Swabe’s LS what=how could you
describe it function it’s a kind
of ◦ er◦
(.2)

By introducing the next topic on the agenda, Andy makes
relevant his omni-relevant identity (i.e., an identity that is not
relevant at all times but that, in certain contexts, can become relevant under pretty much any circumstances; Sacks, 1992, vol. 1,
p. 312) of chairperson who has the right to introduce items on
the agenda. After introducing the topic, Andy continues his turn
by describing the key players and their roles in head office.
As he takes his turn, he downgrades (line 5: I’m not sure) and
hedges (line 6: sort of ) his knowledge, which limits his claims
to epistemic primacy (Raymond & Heritage, 2006, p. 687).
In line 8, he then states: how could you describe it function it’s
a kind of ◦ er◦ which is followed by a slight pause (line 10).
10.
11. Betty
12. Andy
13. Betty

(.2)
it’s the sort of cross cutting policy strategy [thing]
>apparently< I discovered
[yeah]
last week he’s also taking on human resources

Unfortunately, since the recording is an audio recording it
cannot be seen whether eye gaze or another gesture attributes

the next turn to Betty. However, she takes the next turn regardless of whether eye gaze or any other gesture has handed her
the turn. Significant here is the fact that nobody else asserts,
or attempts to assert, a right to take the turn. Betty thus considers that the turn is designed for her as a knowing recipient
and she exercises her right to answer the request for information. She thus both affiliates and aligns with Andy’s prior turn
and she co-authors the account of “what is going on at head
office.” Consequently, she talks into being a team with Andy—
both of them being knowing participants who have the right to
know about what is going on in head office (Goodwin, 1981)
and who co-author this display of knowledge (cf. Djordjilovic,
2012, p. 113). They thus begin to align and affiliate as an interactional team. This sets them apart from the other staff members
and so creates a team based on joint authorship of the action in
progress and on rights to have and display knowledge, rights
that interactionally (at least at present) are unavailable to other
participants.
As Betty’s turn is in progress, Andy backchannels “yeah,”
which, as Stivers (2005, p. 133) argues, is neutral. However,
since it is in a second position the speaker is “vulnerable to
the inference that their response is fabricated on the instance
to achieve agreement or disagreement, and is thus a dependent
or even coerced action within a field of constraint that is established by the first” (Heritage, 2002, p. 200). Thus, simply by
virtue of being in a second position and not seeking to upgrade,
Andy is ceding primacy to his assistant, Betty. This secondness is further reinforced by Betty who speeds up to ensure
that she retains the floor and she adds more information, which
through the use of “discovered” signals it as newsworthy (line
11: >apparently< I discovered last week he’s also taking on
human resources). Receipt of this news becomes a conditionally
relevant next action.
14.
15. Andy

(.2)
oh↑ the whole of HR will go

After a pause, Andy (line 15) replies: oh↑ the whole of
HR will go. Following Raymond and Heritage (2006, p. 691),
the “oh” prefacing functions as an epistemic upgraded, which
marks a change of state in his knowledge. Further, since he continues his turn by adding more information (the whole of HR will
go) it is also hearable as indexing his own independent access
to “what is going on in head office.” Andy thus now displays
his epistemic primacy in the co-authoring of what is going on at
head office.
So far, Andy and Betty have dominated the floor to display their rights to knowledge, but in line 16 Chris takes a
turn, which disaligns and disaffiliates with the emerging interactional team Andy/Betty and thus interactionally marks himself
out as not being part of this emerging team. Following Stivers
et al. (2011), Chris’s turn disaligns with the talk-in-progress
because sequentially it sets up a trajectory that displays no
knowledge of what is going on in head office, and by changing to a humorous footing it also disaffiliates with the emerging
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team of Betty–Andy at an affective level. Consequently, a hierarchy of participants with rights to know about head office and
others who have lesser rights to display knowledge about head
office begins to emerge in talk. This makes relevant an in-group
and an out-group based on epistemic states, and these groups
are interactionally positioned in a relative hierarchy of knowing that instantiates the organization as an in situ and lived
accomplishment.
◦ £↓taking them on↑£◦
((collective [laughter))
]))
[taking them on] £probably needs to£ ah ha
ha >from the
discussion everybody had with him last week< er I
think when the current head
of erm HR leaves in (.) July is it↑
Andy uhum
Debbie ◦ I think that◦ [ as ]

16. Chris
17. All
18. Betty
19.
20.
21.
22.

On account of the collective laughter (line 17), Chris’s turn
(line 16: ◦ £↓taking them on↑£◦ ) is oriented as a pun. This
is because the phrasal verb “to take on” can either be in the
sense of assuming responsibility for something or somebody,
or challenging or fighting them. After affiliating with the pun
by repeating it and laughing (line 19: taking them on £probably
needs to£ ah ha ha >from the discussion everybody had with
him last week), Betty retrospectively treats the prior sequence
as a side-sequence (i.e., “a break in contrast to a termination;
that is, the on-ongoing activity will resume”; Jefferson, 1972,
p. 29) that has (temporarily) disaligned with the main action in
progress—namely, displaying knowledge of what is going on in
head office—and that has been disaffiliative of the interactional
team Andy/Betty. In line 18, Betty then speaks more rapidly to
retain the floor and returns to the action in progress—a description of head office—so orienting to the pun as a side-sequence.
In line 19, Betty states: er I think when the current head of erm
HR leaves in (.) July is it↑. On the one hand, as Kärkkäinen
(2003, p. 130) points out, “I think” projects backward to a prior
turn and marks it out as troublesome, yet at the same time “I
think” projects that more talk on the matter in hand (i.e., what’s
going on at head office) is forthcoming. “I think” also functions as an epistemic downgrade (Stivers 2005, p. 136), which
combined with the request for confirmation (July is it↑) displays that Betty considers that she has secondary rights in the
issue. As previously stated, without access to video recording
it is impossible to say whether the turn is specifically designed
for Andy through eye gaze or gesture. Nevertheless, Andy fills
the slot and so orients to his epistemic responsibility to confirm
the information, and despite the fact that he doesn’t know, he
still orients to the need to provide a second. He thus treats himself as the addressee and displays orientation to the interactional
team as a knowing participant who should have this knowledge.
Debbie then takes a next turn, which projects knowledge and
so projects affiliation and alignment with the ongoing authoring of the topic “what is going on in head office.” She claims
a discursive identity of a knowing participant who has the right

to add to the co-authored description of head office and so she
claims the situated identity of being part of the management
team.
22. Debbie
23. Betty
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Andy
Betty
Andy
Betty
Andy

31. Betty

◦

I think that◦ [ as ]
[Jane ] Jane Ryecraft moves over and
she will essentially report
to him (.) he’s got also cultur:al relations unit Martin’s
unit [for ] example
[ yeah ]
works there but I guess it’s all the sort
(.)
marketing [communications]
[underpinning] communicat [ions]
[ the ] Chris
Whitehouse stuff
yeah

Debbie’s turn (line 22) projects giving an opinion, albeit
epistemically downgraded (I think), on the topic of head office
and she thus projects a display of knowledge. However, as the
turn is in progress, it is overlapped and Betty continues her
description of events at head office. In this way, Betty orients
to Debbie’s turn as potentially competitive and to Debbie as
not being a knowing participant and not having the right to coauthor the description in progress. She thus excludes Debbie
from the emerging interactional management team. This, therefore, reinforces the in- and out-group and so maintains the
achieved hierarchy of the organization, which is based on states
of knowing and rights to display this knowledge that are linked
to claims of proximity to head office.
Betty, having competitively taken the floor, continues her
turn, which continues the topic of “what is going on in head
office” (line 23: [Jane] Jane Ryecraft moves over and she will
essentially report to him (.) he’s got also cultur:al relations unit
Martin’s unit [for ] example works there but I guess it’s all the
sort). As the turn is in progress, she is overlapped by Andy’s
agreement token (yeah), which, as explicated before, displays
alignment and affiliation. However, by virtue of its sequential
placement after Betty’s turn, the “yeah” displays epistemic secondness. As Betty continues her turn, she pauses (line 27) and
Andy (line 28: marketing [communications]) collaboratively
completes the turn in progress with an increment that allows
two different participants to co-author a turn (Vorreiter, 2003).
Further, this is hearable as doing being a team (Kangasharju,
1996; Sacks, 1992). This is because, as Sacks states, there is
no better way of doing being a team than putting together an
utterance collectively (Sacks, 1992, vol. 1, p. 145). Further,
it also displays that the members of the team know what is
on each other’s minds so that what the initial speaker of the
turn knows, the completer of the turn also knows (Sacks, 1992,
vol. 1, p. 147). Thus, the interactionally occasioned team (BettyAndy) is again realized in talk through displays of epistemic
alignment and affiliation, which does co-authoring of the action
in progress (i.e., describing what is going on in head office).
However, in terms of epistemics, Andy’s co-authoring usurps
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the primacy in Betty’s turn. This is because he makes himself
the primary spokesperson and so “owner” of the stance that
Betty initiated and so claims primacy (Mazeland, 2009). Thus,
even though Betty and Andy are aligning and affiliating with
each other and so talk into being a team, they are simultaneously disputing epistemic primacy within the team and they are
jockeying for position in the organizational hierarchy. Further,
in the next turn (line 29: [underpinning ] communicat[ions]),
Betty as the initiator of the completed turn has the right to confirm or disconfirm the completion (Diaz et al, 1996), and in this
case Betty modifies the turn by changing marketing communications to underpinning communications. This modification,
as Diaz et al. (1996, p. 538) point out, displays agreement and
understanding and so aligns and affiliates. So, again, affiliation
and alignment between Andy and Betty is maintained in talk
and a co-authored version of what is going on in head office
emerges.
In line 30, Andy then gives the gist “the Chris Whitehouse
stuff,” which adds to the co-authored description of what is
going on in head office. Since confirmation is not explicitly
sought, Andy’s addition to the description in progress “can be
seen as a competitive move because it asserts epistemic authority over the claim and so undercuts the primary rights of the
first speaker” (Stivers, 2005, p. 137). Thus, even though Betty
and Andy are working in an interactional team, as shown by
the co-authoring of the description of head office, the terms
of displaying knowledge are disputed through the repeated
moves to claim epistemic primacy. In line 31, Betty responds
to this with an agreement token (yeah), which is now in a second position and so acquiesces to Andy’s primacy within the
team Andy/Betty. Debbie then takes a turn, which adds to this
co-constructed display of knowledge.
In line 32, Debbie adds knowledge management to Betty’s
and Andy’s co-authored description of head office.
32. Debbie
33. Andy

knowledge management =
= knowledge management Jenny Smithson is there

This turn therefore claims the discursive identity of a knowing participant with a discursive right to co-author the ongoing
description of head office and she therefore claims a situated identity of being part of the emerging management team.
This time, Debbie’s turn is retrospectively treated as alignment
with the emerging interactional team Andy and Betty. This is
because, in line 33, Andy repeats the turn, thus confirming
it as an aligning move. However, by adding new information (line 31: = knowledge management Jenny Smithson is
there) he also claims primacy by “underscoring his assertion
of greater epistemic authority” (Stivers, 2005, p. 148). Thus,
while Debbie’s contribution is seen as an allowable contribution to the unfolding talk and she has been allowed to co-author
what is going on at head office, nevertheless her knowledge is
treated as secondary to Andy’s. Betty then takes a turn, which
does a formulation and which sums up the gist of the talk-so-far
(Heritage and Watson, 1979).

34. Betty
35.
36.

it is really anything to do with communication because
partly his skills are
very much in the communicating field >whereas<
Robin Baker is the political
strategic person=

In terms of epistemics, this formulation fixes the meaning of
the talk-so-far that it (i.e., the corporate affairs group cf. line 4)
“is really anything to do with communications his [i.e., Jim’s]
skills are very much in the communicating field.” As Clifton
(2006) notes, the ability to sum up fixes the sense of the talk-sofar and thus it can be seen as having the last word in the jostling
for epistemic primacy in the prior turns. Further, a formulation
can act as closure (Heritage & Watson, 1979), and once the
topic of Jim Pryde’s role in the company is closed a move to
a new topic can be initiated. In this case, Betty speeds up to
hold the floor (line 35: >whereas<) and shifts topic to Robin
Baker, whom she describes as “the political strategic person”
(line 35).
34. Betty

it is really anything to do with communication because
partly his skills are
35.
very much in the communicating field >whereas<
Robin Baker is the political
36.
strategic person=
37. Andy = the £Machiavelli£
38. Betty £ I refrained from saying that £
39. Debbie ◦ this is being recorded remember Andy◦
40. Andy ..hh don’t worry I’ve got a copy of this er letter erm SO
Jim Jim is
41.
going to come you know he specifically asked me when
we met at
42.
the Europe regional team meeting if he could have some
time in the
43.
erm to talk to people find out a bit more what things
doing erm .hh

Betty’s turn (line 35) describing Robin Baker as the “political strategic person” is an evaluation that thus requires a
second (Pomerantz, 1984b), which Andy does (line 37: =
the £Machiavelli£). This turn aligns with Betty’s prior turn,
since it continues the progressivity of talk, and it also affiliates with Betty because it displays the same stance (i.e., using
Machiavelli as a synonym for a political strategic person).
Consequently, through co-authoring the turn Betty and Andy
display that they have access to the same knowledge and that
they have the same rights to display this knowledge. However,
£Machiavelli£ is uttered in a smile voice (i.e., “a markedly
higher pitch and an intonational contour comparable to laughing
during speaking but without any laughter tokens”; Buttny, 2001,
p. 317), and so despite aligning and affiliating, thus sustaining
the interactional team, it changes footing by presenting it as a
candidate laughable. In the next turn, also using a smile voice,
Betty states £ I refrained from saying that £. This utterance thus
displays an orientation to Andy’s prior turn as improper talk
(Jefferson, Sacks, & Schegloff, 1987, p. 160), which indexes a
move toward intimate interaction and so seeks to build social
solidarity and affiliation. Sequentially, orientation to a prior
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turn as an impropriety invites participants to reciprocate in
the next turn as a conditionally relevant next action (Jefferson,
1979, p. 83). Significantly, it is Betty who aligns with Andy’s
candidate laughable and so shares the in-joke, which builds solidarity (Richards, 2006, p.109). This displays access to the same
knowledge as Andy, and it also displays affiliation and alignment. Consequently, the turn sustains the interactional relevance
of the team Andy–Betty. Significantly, no other member of staff
seeks to respond to the candidate laughable or align in the coconstruction of knowledge by “sharing the joke.” Conversely,
citing the fact that the meeting is being recorded, Debbie orients to Andy’s turn as a breach of normative behavior and
chides him (line 39: ◦ this is being recorded remember Andy◦ )
for doing an impropriety that is explicitly “on record.” In this
way, she both disaligns and disaffiliates with the humorous coconstruction of knowledge, thus making the interactional team
of Andy and Betty even more distinct. Andy responds to this
criticism by stating that he has a letter from the researcher guaranteeing anonymity (line 40: ..hh don’t worry I’ve got a copy of
this er letter erm). He then closes topic by formulating the gist
of talk so far (SO Jim Jim is going to come) and carries out a
stepwise topic shift to the visit itself (lines 41 ff: you know he
specifically asked me when we met at the Europe regional team
meeting if he could have some time in the erm to talk to people
find out a bit more what things doing erm .hh).

OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
As various researchers contest, organizations do not exist
as prediscursive entities. Rather, they are talked into being
as members go about their everyday workplace activities.
Consequently, from such an ethnomethodologically inspired
perspective, the only point to study them is, to borrow a term
from Cooren (2006), the terra firma of interaction as they
emerge in talk. CA provides one way of doing this because
as the participants police their discursive rights to have and
display knowledge they also reflexively make relevant institutional identities that have rights and obligations in relation to
each other. It is orientation to these rights and obligations that
reflexively instantiates the hierarchy of the organization. In sum,
this article establishes how orientation to rights to have and display knowledge indexes institutional identities, their proximity
to head office, and thus their relative positions on the corporate ladder, and it is through this process that the hierarchy of
the organization is talked into being. Moreover, these rights are
policed, and when on one occasion Debbie seeks to become part
of this interactional team with access to head office, she is oriented to as not having the right to do so and is not allowed to
co-author a display of knowledge. However, the borders of the
management team are porous, and in another instance Debbie
does succeed in co-authoring the description of head office and
so becomes part of the management team. But notwithstanding this co-incumbency of the identity of knowing participant,
this identity is restricted to one turn in talk and even then it is
immediately downgraded by Andy’s following turn.
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Significantly, even within the interactionally realized management team Betty and Andy jockey for epistemic primacy
through the use of completions, upgrades, and downgrades. This
indicates that rather than being a fixed and prediscursive phenomenon, the hierarchy of an organization is always open to
negotiation. Moreover, in certain instances in the analysis it
is clear that Betty, who on paper is the subordinate of Andy,
actually displays more knowledge and makes stronger claims
to primacy and so makes a stronger claim for knowing what
is going on in head office. Consequently, through displaying
a closer link with the organization’s headquarters she claims
a higher position in the hierarchy, which is not commensurate
with her a priori identity as Andy’s deputy. It is also significant that of the other participants in the meeting, few seek to
co-author the description of “what’s going on in head office.”
Indeed, Chris changes footing and displays no knowledge of
head office and thus no affiliation or alignment with the interactional team Andy/Betty. This makes interactionally relevant inand out-groups based on rights to have and display knowledge.
Further, this in-group/out-group formation can also be seen
when Debbie sanctions Andy for an impropriety with which
Betty has aligned and affiliated.
This article therefore shows the way in which the policing of epistemic rights reflexively sets up an in-group with
knowledge (superiors) and an out-group (subordinates), and it
is through this display of knowledge of head office that the
interactionally achieved management team claims proximity to
head office. This claim talks into being a vertical organizational
hierarchy. The article therefore adds to our knowledge of socioepistemics within an organizational context and demonstrates
one way in which the organization is communicatively constituted in talk: namely through the negotiation of epistemic rights.
Further, since these claims to knowledge reflexively make relative positions in the hierarchy (as indexed by proximity to head
office) relevant to the interaction, “being in the know” enacts
status, as defined by Enfield (2011, p. 291) as a collection of
entitlements (or rights) and responsibilities (duties) vis-à-vis
other members of a social group. Thus, “when speakers orient to their asymmetrical position as regards some knowledge,
they orient to the normatively organised social distribution of
authoritative access to bodies or types of knowledge” (Drew,
1991, p. 45). In other words they reflexively talk into being
legitimate organizational identities that incarnate hierarchical
(organizational) structure and so do authority. This is because
authoritative access to knowledge of head office is linked to
position rather than to actual states of knowledge. Consequently,
epistemic authority, in this case at least, is commensurate with
wider concepts of authority that define it as legitimate power
vested in particular people or positions (Weber, 1947, quoted
in Kahn and Kram, 1994, p. 17). In this case, power to author
an account of what is going on at head office is limited to
the interactional management team, who simultaneously claim
a privileged link with head office, unavailable to other participants, and offer this link as an authoritative basis of their
knowledge. Thus, knowledge is displayed not from firsthand
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experience but by virtue of identity, which enacts legitimate
status-based rights to know and so “does” authority. However,
it is not enough merely to possess such entitlements to knowledge; these must be exercised as a way of demonstrating that
one has the necessary status to have and display such knowledge. Furthermore, each time authority to know is enacted it
is also put at risk, and as Debbie’s attempts to display knowledge of head office demonstrate, such status-based authority is
not the property of somebody by virtue of their position alone.
Rather, identities have to be actively constructed in talk so that
authority, as with any other organizational phenomena, can be
seen as a negotiated process that is “distributed among organizational members, negotiated between superiors and subordinates,
and distributed between co-workers” (Benoit-Barné & Cooren,
2009, p. 6). Consequently, CA-inspired research into the micropractices of a meeting can reveal the seen but unnoticed way
in which authority is accomplished through differential turntaking rights that are used to display knowledge. The fact that,
as this article reveals, these rights are based on status rather than
actual states of knowledge demonstrates how authority based
on hierarchical position is talked into being. In short, such a
micro-approach to organization can reveal the mechanisms by
which authority as a process is achieved as members’ practice.
Furthermore, fine-grained analysis of meeting talk can illustrate
that status-based authority is not the working out of an a priori
hierarchy by judgemental dopes (Garfinkel, 1967); it is actually
negotiated and achieved as members go about their everyday
workplace activities.
Finally, while the communicative constitution of organization has been amply described elsewhere (as already discussed),
this article does so from an epistemic perspective that so far has
been relatively lacking in organizational research (though see
Clifton, 2012; Djordjilovic, 2012; Markaki & Mondada, 2012).
This is because at a proximal level the sequential properties
of talk make relevant the identities of knowing and unknowing participants, which reflexively make the situated identities
of “management team” and thus superior/subordinate relevant
to the interaction. It is the achievement of these situated or
institutional identities together with their epistemic rights and
obligations relative to other organizational players that talks
into being organizational structure. As Samra-Fredericks (2010,
p. 212) notes, “For ‘organization’ to take shape or form, a
complex mesh of historical and culturally furnished role-based
rights and obligations need to be observed” (my italics). Thus,
one way in which the organization is communicatively constituted in talk is through orientation to institutional identities and
the epistemic role-based rights and obligations that are enacted
as they emerge in talk. Furthermore, by a process of lamination
(Boden, 1994, p. 151), selections from past practices are enacted
in the present and they laminate, layer upon layer, upon prior
interaction. Such laminated and shared understandings of how
to act perform particular practices, such as displaying rights to
knowledge, that then become routine so that the structure of the

organization collapses into the immediacy of action (structurein-action). As a result of this process, organization emerges
simultaneously as an essential resource for going about everyday workplace activities and as an external and constraining
social fact.
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APPENDIX: TRANSCRIPTION SYMBOLS USED
(2.5)
approximate length of pause in seconds
(.)
micro pause
[word]
overlapping utterances
:
sound stretching
=
latched utterances
↑word, ↓word
marked movement in pitch
stressed syllable
Excellent
< word >
slower than surrounding talk
>word <
faster than surrounding talk
.hh
inbreath
◦
word◦
spoken more softly than surrounding talk
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WORD
£word£
((action))

spoken more loudly than surrounding text
spoken with smile voice
description of action
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